e.g., a rising share of services in aggregate output, are unlikely to produce an abrupt drop in aggregate volatility.
In this section we argue, echoing Blanchard and Simon (2001) , that the suddenness of the volatility drop is more apparent than real-that, in fact, large shocks in the 1970s and a deep contraction in the early 1980s obscure longer term developments that contributed to a downward drift in volatility even before the 1980s. Figure 1 provides some evidence on this issue, showing quarterly annualized growth rates for the four NIPA sectors that comprise GDP: nondurable goods, durable goods, services, and structures. Each is scaled by its nominal share of GDP so that the magnitudes (in terms of growth contributions) are comparable, and the scale of the charts is the same as in Figure 1 . It is clear from these …gures that only in the durable goods sector did volatility change in much the same way-both in terms of magnitude and timing-as GDP.
Nondurables output volatility dropped, but it had also been lower in the 1960s before increasing in the 1970s, and in any case it was never anywhere nearly as volatile as durables. Thus the decline-such as it was-is unlikely to have been a major factor in the stabilization of the early 1980s. Service sector output was also never nearly as volatile as durable goods output, and moreover, its volatility dropped substantially in the early 1960s, and again in the 1970s, long before the break in GDP volatility. Structures output did experience a drop in volatility at the same time as overall GDP, but the size of the sector and the magnitude of the contribution is modest. 1 That both in magnitude and timing, the drop in GDP volatility appears most closely related to developments in the durable goods sector is further illustrated in Figure 2 . The top half plots rolling 5-year variances for the same four sectors and GDP, along with a "covariance term re ‡ecting the variance of GDP not accounted for by the variances of the sectors. This …gure also suggests that both for total GDP and especially for durables, the volatility decline in the early 1980s was an acceleration of a trend that dates back to World War II. Only the durables sector volatility exhibits a downward trend on the order of that followed by overall GDP volatility. The bottom half of Figure 2 shows the analogous chart for GDP broken down by expenditure categories. Prominent in the evolution of volatility is the inventory investment term and the covariance term. Figure 2 is, in e¤ect, just accounting, and does not prove cause and e¤ect. It is possible that the decline in GDP volatility caused the decline in durables sector volatility, or in inventory investment volatility, or that all three had a common cause. Still, a challenge for any explanation of the overall decline in GDP volatility is to account for the speci…c patterns observed in this …gure, as well as the more detailed facts regarding inventories and durable goods found below in Sections 2 and 3.
As another illustration of the trend in volatility, we estimate a GARCH process for GDP growth, and for durables output growth, including time trends and other variables to explain changing volatility. The results are depicted in Table 2 . The speci…cation for the time series process is just an AR (1) . The variance equation includes the usual GARCH terms, plus a time trend, and the trend squared (given that the variance has to remain positive). Also included in some speci…cations was the (lagged) 10-year treasury bond rate, to proxy for in ‡ation and the volatility of the 1970s, and a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for the observations beginning in 1984Q1. The results show a signi…cant downward trend in the variance, with the 10-year rate also coming in signi…cantly, but with the post-1983 dummy not signi…cant when added to the equation. Thus once one accounts for the volatility trend, and the uptick in volatility in the 1970s and early 1980s, it would appear that the post-1983 decline in volatility is better represented as the continuation of a longer-term trend than as a one-time break.
Changing Inventory Behavior
Since the early 1980s there have been a number of signi…cant changes in the behavior of inventories in aggregate data. 2 Here we focus on the durable goods sector. While the inventory literature has traditionally focused on more disaggregated data, and in particular on the 2-digit (SIC) level manufacturing data, for the questions examined in this paper it is more appropriate to look at aggregate data. Disaggregated data can be misleading because it is impossible to tell whether changes in inventory behavior are genuine or just the result of a change in location or ownership of inventories. For example, if manufacturers decide not to hold …nished goods inventories, but instead to ship goods to wholesalers or retailers immediately upon completion, that would appear as a big decline in manufacturing …nished goods inventories, even though it would be largely o¤set by an increase in wholesale or retail inventories. Similarly, if manufacturers in one industry were to insist on "just-in-time"delivery of materials from suppliers, that could look like a dramatic decline in materials inventories for manufacturers, but it would likely be o¤set by increases in the inventories of suppliers, who would likely be from di¤erent industries.
A potentially important fact about the Great Moderation is that output volatility fell by substantially more than (and earlier than) …nal sales volatility, particularly in the durable goods sector. 3 Since the di¤erence between output and …nal sales is the change in inventories, this fact implies a change in inventory behavior-either a reduction in the volatility of inventory investment, or a change in the covariance between inventory investment and sales. Note that by convention, the service and structures sector do not carry inventories (in structures this is because …nal output includes construction in progress), so the source of the change in inventory behavior must by de…nition lie in the goods sector. 4 Figure 3 shows the behavior of output and sales volatility over time in the durable goods sector. In contrast to the behavior of output volatility, sales volatility shows only a modest decline. 5 Given our focus on the volatility of real growth rates (as opposed to levels), we can examine a similar relationship between output, inventories and sales in terms of growth contributions. Although inventory investment, because it can be negative, does not have a conventionally de…ned growth contribution, we can de…ne it indirectly as the di¤erence between the growth rate of output and the growth contribution of …nal sales (cf. Kahn et al, 2002) . Following Whelan (2000) we can approximate the latter in terms of the real growth rate of sales and the nominal share of sales in output. Letting xy denote the growth contribution of
x to output y, where x = s for sales and x = i for inventories, we de…ne the growth contribution of inventory investment as iy = yy sy where sy = ss sy , sy is the nominal share of s in y (measured as the average of current and lagged shares).
The growth contribution of a variable to itself is just its real growth rate.
With these de…nitions in hand, we can track the contributions of sales and inventory investment to the variance of output growth over time:
where the variances and covariance on the right-hand side refer to the growth contributions de…ned above. Figure 4 plots the three components for the durable goods sector. We see that both the inventory term and the covariance term exhibit a substantial downward trend, with the covariance term accounting in particular for the big drop in the early 1980s. Thus not only is the apparent break in 1984 associated with a change in inventory behavior, but the downward trend from the 1950s onward is as well.
In addition to this indirect evidence of changing inventory behavior, we can directly examine the inventorysales ratio in the durable goods sector. Figure 5 shows that whether one looks at the ratio of real (in year 2000 dollars) inventories to real sales, or nominal to nominal, the ratio began a sharp declined in the early 1980s, at the same time that volatility in the sector declined. This is not by itself a proof of "progress;" it could just represent a shift along a …xed technological tradeo¤ in response to changing costs, or a compositional change within the sector. But the timing of the break in trend is striking.
6 4 There is, however, evidence of a change in inventory behavior in construction, even though it is not treated as such in the NIPAs. See Kahn (2000) . 5 McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) …nd evidence of a statistically signi…cant break in the mid-1980s in durables output but not in …nal sales. 6 While it is possible that inventory-holding has been pushed o¤shore-for example, the inventory data include materials stocks, and …rms shift to foreign suppliers-it is worth noting that a similar time pattern is present in 2-digit manufacturing data excluding materials stocks from the inventory-sales ratio.
Secondly, the inventory-sales ratio is clearly less volatile (relative to its varying trend), suggesting that businesses either make smaller mistakes or are able to correct their inventories more quickly. Again this is not de…nitive as it could be that the shocks are smaller or that the industry composition has shifted. Kahn et al. (2002) also describes results from a VAR with sales and inventories that indicates a change in the variance decomposition pre-and post-1983. Before 1983 sales accounted for much more of the variance of inventories than inventories did of sales (37.8 percent versus 5.4 percent); after 1983 they were almost even (18.2 versus 14.9), consistent with the idea that …rms were better able to anticipate sales and adjust inventories in advance. Moreover, the residual variance of sales dropped precipitously, meaning that less of the variation in sales was unpredicted given prior sales and inventories.
Although we have focused on the durable goods sector as a whole, for reasons emphasized earlier, we can examine disaggregated manufacturing data as well. This helps to alleviate concerns that the patterns in the aggregate sector are somehow misleading, either because they stem from compositional change (e.g. relative growth of less volatile industries within the sector) or are unrepresentative of a broad range of subsectors. Table 1 shows the volatility of production and sales growth for 2-digit durable goods manufacturing industries over the periods 1967-83 and 1984-1997. (The data are not available prior to 1967, and after 1997 the industry classi…cations were changed, so the series are not continuous.) The table shows a similar pattern across all eleven industries: a large reduction in the volatility of both output and sales growth. The only qualitative di¤erence with the NIPA aggregate durables data is that for many industries the decline in sales volatility is approximately as large as the decline in output volatility. This suggests that some of the change in inventory behavior may occur more downstream in the wholesale or retail sectors. But the reduced volatility is clearly not due to compositional change, nor is it con…ned to a small subset of industries.
A Model of Durable Goods Production and Inventory Behavior
One approach to assessing the role of improved inventory control is to be agnostic about the details, but look for changes in parameters and propagation in, for example, a structural VAR. This is the approached A second approach is a more speci…c model of improved inventory control as in Kahn et al (2002) , based on the approach in Kahn (1986) and Bils and Kahn (2000) . Firms carry …nished goods inventories to avoid stockouts in the face of uncertain demand, trading o¤ the cost of foregone pro…ts against the cost of carrying inventories. If demand is serially correlated, the mistakes will get magni…ed in production volatility, so that it will exceed the volatility of sales. If technology enables …rms to have better information about demand disturbances, then they will make smaller errors in their production decisions, and the additional volatility induced by correcting those errors is reduced. Firms may also be able to hold fewer inventories.
This type of mechanism can account for reduced production volatility (relative to the volatility of sales), but has several drawbacks. First, depending on the timing of the arrival of information, either the volatility of sales actually increases substantially, or the covariance of sales with inventory investment increases. As we have seen, the opposite is the case in the data. The reason sales volatility increases in this model is that the improved information essentially allows …rms to accommodate demand shocks as opposed to damping them via stockouts. The covariance of sales and inventory investment only becomes more negative if the …rm gets the information in time to adjust production su¢ ciently in advance (due to a desire to smooth production if costs are convex) that inventory movements anticipate the demand shock. Then when the shock occurs, inventory investment moves in the opposite direction, as anticipated by the …rm. But this tends to exacerbate sales volatility.
The second problem with this approach, as alluded to in the introduction, is that it does not apply so obviously or directly to the durable goods sector, much of which is best characterized as production-to-order rather than production-to-stock. And as pointed out by Humphries et al (2001) and many others, most inventories, particularly in durable goods, are of materials or works in process, not …nal goods. Third, while there is much anecdotal evidence of technology that might provide better information about future sales, there is no direct evidence to assist in specifying a model. And as this discussion suggests, the details matter.
Because the model involves at least two types of stocks (works-in-process or "intermediate" goods, and un…lled orders of …nal goods), and will distinguish between materials orders and deliveries, a lot of notation is involved. Let D t denote deliveries of materials at date t, which get combined with labor N M t to produce Y M t , which is the ‡ow of intermediate goods that gets added to the stock M t of works-in-process inventories at the end of period t. U t is the stock of un…lled orders of …nal goods, X t the ‡ow from M t 1 into …nal production (i.e. gross output at the intermediate stage), Y F t , which corresponds to shipments of …nal goods, and O t the ‡ow of new orders for …nal goods. Value added at the …nal stage is
We assume a Leontief technology for non-labor inputs at each stage. Thus we have
(1)
To simplify, we abstract from materials inventories and assume that all materials are immediately converted into works-in-process. Figure 7 provides a schematic diagram of the model.
A key element of the model is the delivery lag for materials orders, which we denote by . A longer lag means that when the …rm makes a decision about materials orders it has less information about what the state of the economy will be when the materials arrive. Consequently the decisions will be less accurate, and will (as the model will show) induce greater volatility in production. By the same token, if …rms are, by whatever means, whether it be information technology or management resources, able to shorten the lead time, they can reduce this source of volatility, and also potentially reduce average inventory holding costs.
While much has been written about information technology and inventory control, and in particular the push toward "just-in-time" inventory management, it is di¢ cult to …nd direct and tangible evidence of improved inventory management. There is time series evidence on , however: the Institute for Supply Zara doesn't have to worry about any of that.... It does not overstock, and unsuccessful designs are often whisked o¤ shelves after just a week, so the company doesn't have to slash prices. Equipped with handheld devices linked directly to the company's design rooms in Spain, Zara's store managers can report daily on what customers are buying, scorning, and asking for but not …nding. Most important, the company takes just ten to …fteen days to go from designing a product-which, to be sure, often means knocking o¤ a hot new look-to selling it.
This idea of better information at any point in time was incorporated into the Kahn et al (2002) model for a production-to-stock technology. But while it is undoubtedly part of the larger story of improved inventory management, it is di¢ cult to quantify. The primary reason for focusing on shorter lead times is not because it is the only, or even the most important, aspect of improved inventory management. It is just that there is some quantitative evidence on it, however limited.
One-Period Lead Time
Given the discrete time nature of the model, for the sake of simplicity we will assume that is an integer, representing the number of periods ahead ("lead time") the …rm must order materials before they will arrive.
To start with we will assume a one-period lead time for materials. So the timing is as follows: An materials
and total the cost of producing Y F t is cY F t , where
The …rm incurs additional costs from carrying inventories of works-in-process.
We assume that prices are …xed and …nal goods orders O t follow a stochastic process, which for concreteness we assume is a simple AR(1):
We also assume that there is no "spec"…nal production, so X t is chosen only to …ll known (i.e. un…lled) orders as of the beginning of period t, which do not include new orders O t . The idea is that …nal production involves customization that can only be done for a speci…c order. Intermediate production is more generic, and can be done speculatively. X t may also be constrained by the availability of works-in-process
We assume the …rm maximizes pro…ts subject the various technological constraints:
subject to
where V i denotes value added, Y i gross output at each stage (i = M; F ), and < 1 is a discount factor. For p su¢ ciently large (that is, for a positive markup), the …rm will always try to …ll all un…lled orders U t 1 at date t. This implies
That is, subject to availability of works-in-process, X t is chosen to …ll all un…lled orders U t .
Note the timing assumptions here: All new orders in period t are un…lled as of the end of t; shipments during t are for orders placed at t 1 or earlier Whether or not new orders O t are …lled by the end of period t + 1 depends on the adequacy of materials orders Z t , which were made before O t was known. Also note that under certainty, say with constant …nal goods orders O, the above setup implies that
.. There is no reason to hold inventories if both deliveries and orders are known in advance. Un…lled orders are held only because of the assumption that "spec" production is infeasible due to customization requirements.
We can show that the optimal ordering rule decision rule is of the form
where 1 is a constant to be determined (see below). It is then straightforward to show that
M t = max f 1 b F t ; 0g (18)
Whether or not the constraint (10) is binding is re ‡ected in terms like min 1 ; b F t 1 and max f 1 b F t ; 0g.
But note that Z t is not a¤ected by past constraints, nor does it end up depending on 1 . If 1 < b F t ; X t is constrained by materials. This should add to E t fU t+1 g, which it does. But the e¤ect of t on Z t occurs regardless of the outcome of min f 1 ; b F t g, because if there is no stockout (so no increase in un…lled orders) there is the same impact on M t , which also adds to Z t . In other words, as t increases, either M t falls or E t fU t+1 g rises, and both have the same impact on Z t . X t is a¤ected by the outcome of min f 1 ; b F t g because higher t can mean that X t is constrained by the stock of works-in-process. Note that if 1 < b F t , there will be un…lled orders carried over into t + 1 (i.e. U t+1 > O t+1 ), as the …rm had insu¢ cient works-in-process to …ll U t , so some of those un…lled orders get carried over into t+1.
In the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), "sales" are really total expenditures on …nal goods. This corresponds to shipments Y F t , i.e.
"Production" Y t is shipments plus the change in inventories, i.e.
It is easy to see that production can be more volatile than sales, in particular when the O t process exhibits positive serial correlation. Letting t min b 1 F 1 ; t ; we can simplify the above expressions (using the fact that max b
Note that v t is negatively correlated with t 1 + E t 1 fO t g (at least for 0), which helps to explain why the variance of production can exceed the variance of sales: Inventory investment covaries positively with shipments. The focus in this paper, however, is not on this, but on how production and shipments volatility vary with .
Finally, what is 1 ? It is straightforward to show that it follows from the …rst-order condition:
where c is as de…ned earlier, the total unit cost of producing the …nal good. Given
we have
The probability is of a materials stockout at data t + 1, and also represents dE t (X t+1 ) =dZ t , the expected impact on "completions"at t+1 from an additional order of materials at t. The intuition is that by ordering an additional unit at date t at cost c, with some probability the …rm gains an additional sale at date t + 1
(the event of a work-in-process stockout at date t + 1), and with one minus that probability it results in surplus stocks and an o¤setting decrease in materials orders at date t + 1.
Suppose t has a c.d.f. of G. We then get
which implies
which, as one would expect, is increasing in the markup and decreasing in the discount rate 1= 1.
Shorter or Longer Delivery Lags 3.2.1 Zero Lead Time
Now consider one extreme: No delivery lag, so D t = Z t . With a little algebra, we can show that
Clearly going from = 1 to = 0 changes the relationship between production and sales volatility. As we shall see, for the realistic case in which O t exhibits positive serial correlation, shrinking the delivery lag from one to zero obviously reduces the gap between the variance of production and the variance of sales. This case is relatively trivial, but nonetheless it provides some insight into why the more interesting case we consider next, shrinking the delivery lag from two periods to one, has the same qualitative impact of reducing the volatility of both production and shipments, but with the former declining more than the latter.
Two-Period Lead Time
We now consider a delivery lag of two periods. We hypothesize a decision rule
where, again, 2 6 = 1 is to be determined. We then have
Let t t + (1 + ) t 1 and u t = min b 1 F 2 ; t . With considerably more algebra than in the = 1 case, we can show (see Appendix) that
The probability is now of a works-in-process stockout at data t + 2, and also represents dE t (X t+2 ) =dZ t .
The intuition is that by ordering an additional unit at date t at cost 2 c, with some probability the …rm gains an additional sale at date t + 2 (the event of a works-in-process stockout), and with one minus that probability it results in surplus stocks and an o¤setting decrease in materials orders at date t + 2: .Suppose t has a c.d.f. of F . We then get
where
Any di¤erence between 1 and 2 would stem from the di¤erence in the relevant distribution function (F vs. G) and from the fact that excess orders are more costly because they take two periods to o¤set. Of course, either of these di¤erences could a¤ect the …rm's markup.
Finally, what is b F E t fU t+2 g E t fM t+1 g? We have
If we compare (48) and (20) we see that now in addition to having to order based on two-period-ahead expected orders, the date t innovation has a magni…ed impact (to the extent > 0). Table 3 gives a comparison of the major variables of interest for the two cases.
Regarding implications for inventory-sales ratios, it turns out that the model is incomplete: Absent a theory of the markup p=c in the two cases ( = 1 and = 2), the relative size of inventory-sales ratios is ambiguous. But under the reasonable assumption that (p c) =(p c) for = 1 and (p c) =(p 2 c) for = 2 are the same (implying that p=c is larger for = 2) , and that markups are larger than the discount rate 1= 1, then inventory-sales ratios will be larger under = 2, essentially because of the greater uncertainty at the time of ordering.
Aggregation
The solutions for the time series behavior output, shipments, and inventories are not realistic characterizations of any data that are likely to be observed. In practice, we observe aggregates, even when we look at relatively disaggregated data. The data are typically aggregates of di¤erent goods, di¤erent locations, and di¤erent …rms. Consequently we never see zeros of any stocks, whether of un…lled orders or inventories.
Fortunately the model is amenable to aggregation as follows. We now suppose a continuum of symmetric …rms, each of which faces stochastic orders as above, but with an idiosyncratic shock v it . That is, for …rm i,
where for concreteness we can assume that v it is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 v , and
Of course, the derivations of 1 and 2 must now be revised to re ‡ect idiosyncratic risk. For example, G in (28) should be the distribution function for t + v it .
The idea here is that each …rm's outcome varies depending on its idiosyncratic shock, so we integrate to get the aggregate. But because of the linear technology, the …rms adjust and go into the next period looking identical. So for aggregate inventories we have (in the = 1 case)
Similarly,
We can linearize 1t around t = 0 :
and we ignore the constant term, which is not relevant for the exercise of computing volatility. Note that for …nite 1 , 2 (0; 1). So we have
So for su¢ ciently large or b F , or small (that is, small 1 ), production is more volatile than sales. Note that need not even be positive for this to be true.
With = 2 we de…ne (assuming for simplicity that idiosyncratic risk is i.i.d.):
We then get
and
Clearly if the …rst is positive, the second is larger for > 0. So holding …xed the shock variance 2 , for parameters in the empirically relevant range, a reduction in the delivery lag (i.e. the lead time for materials orders) results in a reduction in both output and sales volatility, but a greater reduction in output volatility.
Simulations
We can get some feel for the capability of this approach to account for changes in volatility. We choose parameters that roughly match the relevant characteristics of the data in the early part of the sample under the assumption that = 2, and then simulate a change to = 1. This is not to suggest that there actually was such an abrupt change, it is just the limitation of the discrete-time nature of the model. The results of the simulation are shown in Table 4 . The level e¤ects are modest (as they are in the data, though moreso), but the growth rate e¤ects are large. The standard deviation of was chosen so that thes simulation would match the pre-1984 standard deviation of output for = 2 (see the last line of Table   1 ). The model qualitatively matches the basic facts about reduced volatility in the durable goods sector:
Initially production volatility exceeds sales volatility by a lot. Subsequently, both volatilities go down, but production volatility declines by much more than sales volatility. Both volatility declines in the model are smaller than in the data, however.
It should be emphasized that the model is far too stylized for the simulation to be taken seriously as a calibration exercise. Nonetheless, the fact that it at least qualitatively matches the facts suggests that it may be a reasonable basis for pursuing a more realistic extension, perhaps along the lines that Bils and
Kahn (2000) extended Kahn (1987) for empirical purposes.
Conclusions
[to be added]
This appendix provides a derivation of the result for = 2 that materials orders take the form (33)
and that, consequently,
The strategy is to assume the form, derive the implications for the evolution of the endogenous variables, and then show that (33) satis…es the …rst-order condition. Let
And since
which we can substitute into the …rst-order condition (39) to show that (33) is in fact a solution to the optimization problem. 
